A “New Normal”: Legality in Times of Necessity: French Administrative Law under the Health Emergency by Marique, Yseult
: French 
Administrative Law under the Health Emergency 




States of emergency test the limits of constitutionalism and our commitment to the rule of 
law (Dyzenhaus 2012). They tell us something about the ultimate power in a society and 
the very nature of state powers. French constitutions have a long history of arising from 
crises, revolutions and overthrows. The current political regime was born in 1958 at the 
time of the Algerian war of independence. More recently, the French have lived under a 
sustained period of emergency regulations following the terrorist attacks in Paris in 
November 2015. Now that a state of health emergency has been declared and extended 
it is possible to reflect on how key principles relating to the rule of law, such as legality and 
judicial control, are being re-shaped. This helps us to reflect on how the state seeks to 
command compliance from its citizens and how a balance is struck between necessity and 
legality. Key stages can be identified: a first stage when (judicial) control is muted and a 
second stage when judges re-assert their role once the risks linked to the pandemic have 
been curbed. This differentiation both confirms the risk of normalising an executive state 
of emergency (at the time of the peak) and the possibility of a judicial state of emergency 
emerging (once the first wave is over) (Ginsburg and Versteeg 2020). This brings into 
question how the next steps in the health emergency can be made subject to robust 
scrutiny and accountability mechanisms as necessity evolves. 
 
Thank you to Dr Karine Abderemane, Dr Sophie Boyron, Dr Olivia Tambou and members 
of Network of the Future of Administrative Law, especially Professor Emmanuel 
Slautsky, for commenting on a previous draft.  
 
Key words  





1 2 or 
3 of the exceptional trend that academics denounced regarding the state 
of emergency during the period 2015-2017 (triggered by the Paris attacks at the Bataclan 
and the Stadium of France on 13 November 2015)? The UN special rapporteur of the 
Human Rights Council on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism highlighted this risk in times of emergency across the 
world.4 -term well-being to its 
physical survival in the short term, states of emergency do not leave time and space for 
rational collective argumentation based on careful weighting between quantitative 
evidence and qualitative factors in an iterative and/or incremental manner. This leads to 
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probes into whether the executive is all-powerful or whether courts and similar 
mechanisms provide for a form of judicial accountability, as Ginsburg and Versteeg have 
asserted.5 In answering this question for the French health emergency this paper highlights 
that states of emergency need to be looked at as processes with differentiated stages and 
constellations of actors, not as monoliths.  
 
A long tradition in legal scholarship discusses emergencies in terms of law versus facts 
(politics or morality): do we need to find solutions to emergencies in the law or outside of 
it?6 Revolving around the boundary between legality and extra-legality, this question  is 
compliance, maybe against their consent. The legitimacy of this enforcement is related to 
a conservative function of the state of emergency: the state of emergency is supposed to 
ensure that public bodies and social life are safeguarded against a great evil so that 
the commitment of a legal order to the principle of legality and the rule of law.7 
 
Among all the states of emergency established across the world to respond to the Covid-
19 pandemic, analysing one case in depth, such as the French health emergency, helps 
with developing a more analytical approach. Three features of French administrative law 
 true any time, anyway  magnify the bluntness of the decision-making available to French 
public bodies during the Covid-19 pandemic. First is the centralisation of power in the 
national government, in tandem with an endemic reluctance to decentralise decision-
making. Second is the limited space for dissenting voices in decision-making. Third is a 
room for pragmatism and flexibility. Yet, the Covid-19 pandemic highlights how these 
features are in need of adaptation when it comes to addressing new challenges.  
 
After a brief contextualisation of the state of emergency in France the different phases in 
the health emergency will be analysed, namely its adoption, its enforcement, its extension 
and the resistance against it. The signs of wear and tear that ordinary French 
administrative law faces given the Covid-19 pandemic lead to a call for reimagining French 
administrative law  making it fit for the challenges of the 2020s. 
 
II. A History of Crises  
 
France has a long constitutional history of crises, with a regime dealing with state 
emergencies (then in the form of état de siège) going back to the 19th century.8 At the end 
of the First World War the French High Administrative Court developed the doctrine of  
ing to which legality could be set aside when 
circumstances made it impossible for the administration to comply with the law, provided 
some conditions were met.9 This led to the inclusion in the 1958 Constitution of an article 
granting extensive powers to the French president in cases of serious and immediate 
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threats to the institutions of the Republic and of interruption to the proper functioning of the 
constitutional public authorities. This was meant as an answer both to the peculiar 
circumstances of the French surrender in 1940 and to the Algerian war of independence. 
This last event also caused a statute10  still in force today  to be adopted in 1955 to 
framework for dealing with the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015. Many of the specific 
powers introduced to address the threats of new attacks were then enshrined in the 
ordinary criminal procedure, in effect enacting permanent changes in the normal legal 
framework. 
 
III. The Health Emergency as Adopted in the Law: Procedures vs. Circumstances 
 
When Covid-19 struck France social distancing was first introduced on 14 March.11 As the 
population did not comply with these first instructions the prime minister took more 
rest the exceptional circumstances resulting from 
the Covid-19 pandemic
to introduce new provisions in four areas: public health, economic life, elections,12 and 
parliamentary processes. In particular, the statute lists ten areas where individual 
freedoms can be curtailed, including a ban on free circulation except for essential travel, a 
ban on gatherings and restrictions on the freedom to trade. In cases of repeated breaches 
of the ban on circulation a criminal sanction of up to six months jail and 3,750 EUR fine 
was provided for. Three comments can be made about this system concerning the 
efficiency of governmental action, time malleability, and the limited parliamentary and 
judicial control over the state of emergency. 
 
First, this state of health emergency has led to centralising power around the prime minister 
and the Home Office (in charge of public security), with the support of the préfets (i.e., 
representatives of the state at the departmental level) in order to maintain public order and 
public health.13 In addition, as from 24 March, a scientific advisory body was set up to 
pertise 14 
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has been argued that most of the measures to fight Covid-19 had already been taken the 
day before the statute was adopted.  
 
Second, the health emergency has impacted the time taken over the law-making process. 
For instance, time was especially squeezed for the adoption of the statute on 23 March. 
Adopted in less than three days (from 20-22 March), the bill was discussed without any 
real opportunity for amendments:17 there were repeated calls during the discussions to 
shorten discussions and press ahead, and for comments to be limited to essential 
matters.18  
 
Third, the health emergency has been subject to little parliamentary or judicial control over 
executive decision-making.19 By way of parliamentary control, two missions, one of 
information (Lower Chamber) and one of monitoring (Upper Chamber),20 are provided for. 
The former is chaired by a person close to the president, Richard Ferrand. For the 2015 
emergency MPs could ask for investigations on the spot or hearings, an option that was 
not made available to MPs in the 23 March statute.  
 
Control by constitutional, administrative and ordinary judges is also limited. In addition to 
adopted to suspend time limits in 
preliminary references to the Constitutional Council: preliminary references pertaining to 
the constitutionality of the health emergency could hence be delayed until at least 
September 2020, thus escaping scrutiny when it would be most needed. The adoption of 
this statute had to comply with time requirements in accordance with the French 
Constitution: normally such a bill needs to wait for fourteen days between being tabled and 
being discussed. Covid-19 did not allow for such a delay.21 However, in its ruling on this 
organic statute the Constitutional Council confirmed its constitutionality despite the obvious 
peculiar circumstances of the case 22 
 
IV. The Health Emergency as Enforced:23 Legality, Prevention and Repression  
 
The health emergency caused many practical questions to arise regarding its 
implementation and enforcement. This provides food for thought regarding a better 
understanding of how legality  is conceived under French administrative law. Legality is 
highly specific, heavily reliant on sanctions by police and directed towards the efficiency of 
governmental action (i.e. central vs. local level) with little leeway for differentiation. 
 
First, the legality principle in administrative action may refer to the fact that a statutory 
basis is needed to justify administrative decisions, especially when they limit individual 
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freedoms. In the case of Covid-19 the case law-based justification of exceptional 
circumstances  was first relied upon, then dismissed in favour of a formal statutory-based 
exception, although it came back through the window in the constitutional case law in the 
form of peculiar circumstances . In addition, the French High Administrative Court has a 
particular understanding of the legality principle. As of 1 May the French High 
Administrative Court had decided eighty cases based on a specific procedure called 
référé-liberté
individual freedoms in a serious and obviously illegal way. In most cases the French High 
Administrative Court dismissed the challenges (often at the admissibility stage). In the very 
few cases where it did not, it asked the government to specify some aspects of its 
regulations, although with some oddities. One of the cases, decided the day before the 
health emergency was adopted, asked the government to clarify the exemptions to the 
lockdown for health grounds, to reassess the possibility of short trips near the home and 
to assess the risks caused by open-air markets.24 Another decision led to the curious result 
that the government had to adapt its soft law guidance on the use of bikes during the 
lockdown but not to amend its hard law regulation in any way.25 In both cases, the 
contribution of the French High Administrative Court to what counts as legality for 
protecting individual freedoms was minimal during the peak of the health emergency. 
 
Second, respect for the legality principle is paramount when it comes to implementing the 
law and exercising coercive powers. Normally, -developed 
exception , is used to balance individual freedom with public order (and matters such as 
public health), with an emphasis on prevention using administrative tools instead of 
repression through (criminal) sanctions. However, the health emergency reshapes this 
classic understanding: it organises repression and criminal sanctions up to incarceration 
in cases of infringement of the measures limiting freedom of circulation.26 The government 
wanted to send a strong signal to the population with heavy criminal sanctions (up to six 
months in jail in cases of four violations). The enforcement by the police of these provisions 
has implications for individual freedoms and the risks of abuse have been real. For 
instance, problems of interpretation by the police force have been flagged up due to the 
sloppy formulation of the offences.27 Very little guidance was provided to the police 
regarding which travel was allowed. In other cases, the police resorted to extensive 
surveillance techniques in order to ensure compliance. In Paris it rolled out drones, which 
led to concerns over privacy.28 
force citizens to comply with legal requirements at any cost. 
 
Third, the uneasy balance between (central) legality designed in Paris and its 
implementation to address local circumstances is also a key element of French 
administrative law. Centralisation reaches very far. Many mayors tried to take measures 
to address the Covid-19 pandemic in their local government, some introducing curfews, 
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some forbidding access to open spaces or closing down hotels. In many cases they had 
to backtrack as the central government found these measures inappropriate.29  
 
Ville de Sceaux.30 The 
 challenged the decision of this local government to require 
masks for people circulating on the streets. The Home Office joined the challenge: it 
considered that the local by-law was implying that citizens could move freely on the streets 
at a time when people were not supposed to do so according to the national statutory 
framework. The French High Administrative Court quashed the local by-law: local 
provisions based on general administrative policing (i.e., to protect security, salubrity and 
tranquillity) cannot derogate to a case of special policing (here: health protection) as a 
matter of principle. Only if two conditions were met could the mayor derogate from the 
national measures: firstly, when local specificities required the derogation; secondly, 
provided that the consistency and efficiency of the national provisions were not put in 
jeopardy. The principle and the first exception are in line with previous case law. However, 
the second condition is a striking innovation: the French High Administrative Court is not 
supposed to innovate but to follow case law closely when a decision is taken in speedy 
proceedings.31 As a consequence, mayors have seen curtailing of their ability to take 
measures differing from the national policy. This situation causes one to wonder: what 
matters most with legality in France? Uniformity across the country or efficient compliance 
despite differing needs in concrete local circumstances? In other words: legality for the 
-being? 
 
V. The Health Emergency Extended: Exiting the Lockdown Incrementally  
 
Exiting the lockdown is challenging for most countries: governments face competing 
demands to relaunch the economy and re-establish individual freedoms on the one hand 
and to prevent the virus from reappearing on the other hand. On 11 May a statute extended 
the health emergency until 10 July. Once the emergency was extended critical voices 
became more insistent among the French population32 and legal scholarship.33 The 
political discussions behind the extension of the health emergency have revolved around 
two key matters: first, mandatory isolation; secondly, tracing people in contact with sick 
people.  
 
Regarding mandatory isolation, a loosening of the governmental approach can be noticed. 
In the first announcements mandatory isolation was widely conceived of to include 
vulnerable people and any person reported sick with Covid-19 on the French territory. 
However, the opposition to such a broad limitation to the freedom of circulation led the 
government to clarify that isolation would be voluntary in principle and that mandatory 
isolation would be limited to people travelling from abroad. Further exceptions were added 
for travellers coming from the EU, the Schengen space and the UK. Isolation for sick and 
vulnerable people would be purely voluntary. Asked to scrutinise the constitutionality of 
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this extension, the Constitutional Council accepted these measures as constitutional 
provided that they were so interpreted that any measures forbidding a person to leave 
his/her home for longer periods than twelve hours a day would be authorized by a judge.34 
 
Regarding tracing people who had been in contact with sick people, two different strategies 
have been devised. The first one relies on human intervention, namely the training of small 
teams visiting the homes of people at risks, taking samples and educating them on 
the virus among the population in this way. This means a highly resource-intensive system 
for tracing the virus. The second strategy relies on new technologies, namely an app called 
StopCovid. Problems have surfaced, with a risk of habituation to being monitored by 
technologies among the population,35 complex technical implementation and a lack of 
guaranteed success. The app has been delayed. The Constitutional Council interpreted 
the statute extending the health emergency in such a way that the data for scientific 
research had to be anonymised; it also considered some provisions to be non-
constitutional. These included, first, the requirement for assent to the implementation 
decrees from the French data protection authority; secondly, the obligation for public 
bodies to transfer their decisions pertaining to tracing to the Senate and the National 
Assembly.36 This leaves a black hole when it comes to the monitoring of data processing 
in the coming weeks and months. The legality of this app is being shaped incrementally in 
an arm-wrestling match between public authorities and private technological firms37 as 
much as between the executive and the legislative.  
 
VI. The Health Emergency as Resisted: Discussion, Contestation, Monitoring 
  
Polls showed a broad consensus regarding the French health emergency at first. Protests 
emerged only marginally, a striking feat for a country where the situation was rather 
s 
reforms for months in 2018-19 and painful reforms to the retirement system triggered 
demonstrations until the start of Covid-19. However, as the lockdown began getting longer, 
increasing opposition arose. Seventy criminal complaints were logged against the prime 
minister and the ministers of health, justice and/or the Home Office for their management 
of the crisis, for instance. At least three different levels of resistance to the health 
emergency can be identified, which could shape the exit from the lockdown, administrative 
law and life beyond it.  
 
First, scientific, civic and scholarly discussions have flourished during Covid-19. If the 
French president has relied on science to address the pandemic, scientific controversies 
have quickly emerged, most famously in relation to hydroxychloroquine.38 Civil society and 
MPs have started an open consultation on how society could look after Covid-19.39 In 
scholarly circles Covid-19 has sparked discussions in traditional and modern media to an 
34 CC, Décision n°2020-800 DC, 11 May 2020, Loi prorogeant l'état d'urgence sanitaire et complétant ses 
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41 which monitors administrative action and its 
possible abuses. The  has set 
up a monitoring centre dedicated to the lockdown situation.42 Civil society is also actively 
référés-libertés
administrative judge mentioned above are most-often initiated by professional 
organisations and not-for-profits, representing sectorial, professional and social interests. 
Even though they did not succeed in clearly curbing the course of the health emergency 
in the first phase of the health emergency, their indirect impact cannot be understated. 
This willingness to call public bodies to account has led mayors to withdraw their by-laws 
once judicial challenges have been initiated. 
 
Third, a wave of criticism has arisen against the French High Administrative Court, 
perceived as the protector of the executive during this crisis.43 One specific issue pertains 
to its dual role of being both an advisor to the government and an administrative judge.44 
In the 2000s a discussion emerged around the application of article 6 Eur Conv H R to this 
institution, with Strasbourg eventually accepting this dual role and some of its associated 
features. At the time French academics strongly defended these specificities.45 Today, this 
willingness has faded away: academics and practitioners denounce the lack of 
independence of the administrative judge.46 They pinpoint that most challenges against 
administrative measures have been rejected, and the ones which have not been rejected 
are more symbolic than substantive.47 The head of the French High Administrative Court, 
Bruno Laserre, and the head of the litigation section, Jean-Denis Combrexelle,48 have tried 
to defend their institution  but to no avail.  
 
The awkward position held by the , between the executive and citizens, 
between responsiveness to necessity and protection of individual freedoms, has come 
very much to light with Covid-19. From the moment easing out from the lockdown came 
40 
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closer it started taking a different stance towards the legality of the administrative 
decisions. While no administrative decisions pertaining to the health emergency were 
quashed from March 23 onwards, the French High Administrative Court ordered the 
administration to provide masks in prisons on 8 May.49 The approaching easing out of the 
lockdown as from 11 May features clearly in the judgment.50 This judgment was then 
followed by two decisions, one enjoining public authorities to stop using drones in public 
spaces in Paris51 and the other enjoining changes to the regulation of religious 
celebrations.52 It has been noted that these judicial decisions, although technically taken 
in the form of speedy proceedings and thus temporary, have become final: the very 
compliance by the executive with these decisions makes any further proceedings 
redundant.53 
 
Administrative Law?   
 
The health emergency sheds light on the need to reimagine the conceptual, instrumental 
and functional components of French administrative law, to reconcile individual autonomy 
and collective concern for the common good. In more general terms, the very notion of 
-visited to move beyond a positivist and black-letter approach 
to what it means beyond the legality/illegality dichotomy and why legality is a key feature 
of the rule of law. Factors such as time, quantitative and qualitative evidence for 
administrative decision-making, balancing individual privacy with collective health and 
spatial decentralisation and differentiation, impartial review of administrative action, 
exercising coercive powers in the light of social cohesion, and improved flows of better-
explained information (inside the administration, between administrations and public 
bodies, across society) would all need to be given some place in the next administrative 
covenant in France. A new articulation between legality and extra-legality is needed. 
French administrative law could help provide conceptual frames and a practical toolkit to 
articulate the social and the political spheres for living together. Such a renewal of French 
administrative law scholarship is much needed to address the social and economic 
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